Consumer credit regulation and lender market power / by Zachary Bethune, Joaquin Saldain and Eric R. Young.: FB3-5/2024-36E-PDF
"We investigate the welfare consequences of consumer credit regulation in a dynamic, heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous lender market power. We incorporate a decentralized credit market with search and incomplete information frictions into an off-the shelf Eaton–Gersovitz model of consumer credit and default. Lenders post credit offers and borrowers apply for credit. Some borrowers are informed and direct their application toward the lowest offers while others are uninformed and apply randomly"--Abstract, page ii.
Permanent link to this Catalogue record:
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| Title | Consumer credit regulation and lender market power / by Zachary Bethune, Joaquin Saldain and Eric R. Young. |
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| Publication type | Monograph - View Master Record |
| Language | [English] |
| Format | Digital text |
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| Description | 1 online resource (ii, 40 pages) : graphs. |
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