Inference in games without Nash equilibrium : application to restaurants’ competition in opening hours / by Erhao Xie. : FB3-5/2018-60E-PDF

"This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming thatplayers have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions. I show that in games where one player has more actions than the other player, the payoff function is partially identified with neither equilibrium restrictions nor the usual exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, if the cardinality of players’ action sets varies across games, then the payoff and belief functions are point identified up to scale normalizations and the restriction of equilibrium beliefs is testable"--Abstract.

Lien permanent pour cette publication :
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.867624&sl=1

• Format MARC XML
• Format MARC HTML

Demander des formats alternatifs